Enforcement actions (sanctions) aim to penalize guilty companies and provide examples to other companies that bad behavior will be penalized. A handful of papers analyze the consequences of sanctions in banking for sanctioned companies, while no papers have investigated the spillover effects on non-sanctioned banks. Focusing on credit-related sanctions, we show the existence of a spillover effect: non-sanctioned banks behave similar to sanctioned banks, depending on their degree of similarity, offloading problematic loans and reducing their lending activity.
Introduction
The global financial crisis was due to both incomplete regulation and ineffective supervision (Barth et al., 2013; U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011 ). An increasing number of papers have analyzed the impact of regulation on bank behavior, focusing on various issues, such as lending (Lepetitet al., 2015; Ongena et al., 2013; Jiang Li and Shao, 2010), risk-taking (Harris and Raviv, 2014) , economic growth (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Berger and Hannan, 1998; Kroszner and Strahan, 1996) and developing financial sectors across the globe (Beck et al. 2000; Barth et al., 2004) . Surprisingly, less emphasis has been placed on supervision than on regulation, with only a handful of papers empirically assessing the effects of supervision on bank behavior. This is mainly due to a lack of data: most supervisory actions (such as recommendations, requests for capital add-ons, reports from on-site inspections, off-site analysis, etc.) are not ultimately enforced and thus usually remain confidential. As such, the few papers available on the subject (Delis et al., 2017; Delis and Staikouras, 2011; Danisewicz et al., 2017) focus on supervisory enforcement actions (i.e., publicly disclosed actions) in empirically investigating the effectiveness of supervision. Delis et al. (2017) examine the impact of formal enforcement actions on the safety and soundness of sanctioned banks in terms of bank capital, risk, and performance. Delis and Staikouras (2011) analyze the role of bank supervision in controlling bank risk among sanctioned banks, finding that the relationship between sanctions and risk is linear and negative. Denisewicz et al. (2017) examine the relationship between enforcement action with respect to single-market banks and contractions of bank lending and liquidity creation. In the research papers examined, the effectiveness of enforcement action (also labeled "sanctions" in this paper) is measured only in terms of behavioral changes (lending activity, risktaking, capitalization) of sanctioned banks. In reality, sanctions have two complementary goals: first, to penalize the guilty banks; second, to provide an example to other banks that bad behavior will be penalized. All existing papers have analyzed the consequence of sanctions, but none have investigated the cross-effects on non-sanctioned banks.
Our paper contributes to the literature by analyzing whether sanctions increase bank stability and, more importantly, whether enforcement actions against competitors influence the risk-taking of non-sanctioned banks. Therefore, the main purpose of our paper is not to estimate the (endogenous and perhaps obvious) consequences of enforcement actions on sanctioned banks but the consequences on other banks that share common risk features. Specifically, we posit that a non-sanctioned bank cares about enforcement actions taken against other similar banks.
This point is crucial for regulatory and supervisory authorities, which must take into account the effects of enforcement actions on all banks in the system before issuing and publicly disclosing them. A central issue linked to spillover effects on unsanctioned banks, in fact, concerns the publication of sanctions on the Supervisory Authority website. In the U.S., enforcement actions for violations of laws, rules or regulations are published on the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency website in useful Excel files; thus, some papers have focused on the U.S. banking system (Delis et al., 2017) . Unfortunately, the situation in the European banking system is more variegated: only a few National Central Banks (NCBs) publish enforcement actions (see Delis and Staikouras, 2011) , while most prefer that supervisory measures remain confidential. Since November 2014, European banking supervision has undergone an epochal change, with the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for significant banks. To date, no studies of the spillover effects of the publication of enforcement actions against unsanctioned banks within the European banking system have appeared.
We obtain two major results. First, credit risk-related sanctions lead sanctioned banks, in the year following the imposition of sanctions, to retire problematic loans, reduce their lending orientation, reduce their Tier 1 capital and increase their Tier 2 capital. Second, non-sanctioned banks tend to modify their risk-taking in response. Interestingly, we provide empirical evidence that non-sanctioned banks behave more similarly to sanctioned banks, the more similar they are to the sanctioned banks. This is an important result, as it shows that enforcement actions influence not only the stability of sanctioned banks but also that of banks that share common features with sanctioned banks.
Our paper focuses on the Italian banking system, which provides an ideal case study for several reasons. First, Italian banks currently have a huge problem with Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) and exhibit substantial stability problems. As reported by the Bank of Italy (2017) Italy, 2011, page 17) . As such, the Bank of Italy has two separate and independent departments that perform off-site analysis and on-site inspections. In our study, we calculated the number of on-site inspections between 2005 and 2013at 927 (i.e., approximately 20% of Italian banks received on-site inspections during these years). Additionally, we found that 328 banks in our sample had been formally sanctioned and that 3,588 bank employees (including members of Boards of Directors, Senior Managers, Audit Committee members and Chief Executive Officers) received personal sanctions. The Bank of Italy recorded and made public information about all its enforcement actions, with detailed explanations of the reasons for them, in a monthly bulletin. We were thus able to manually collect data on enforcement actions taken, which we classified into five categories based on their reasons (general organizational failure; credit risk failure; omitted credit risk disclosure; reporting and disclosure failure; and residual sanctions). Given the tradition of the Bank of Italy, one may ask whether the Bank of Italy's credit-related enforcement actions during the last decade were effective? Third, the Italian banking system is one of the most important in Europe:
at the end 2015, Italy was the fourth largest banking market for deposits (10.7% of European deposits), total assets (EUR 4.0 trillion, 9% of total European banking assets) and number of employees (299,684 employees)
1 . As such, Italy represents an ideal case study: it is one of the main European banking industries (its instability would create instability for the whole European market), it has a poor-quality lending portfolio, and it has a strong tradition of supervisory onsite inspections and enforcement actions.
The main challenge in assessing the impact of enforcement actions on bank behavior is an endogeneity problem. For example, a study assessing variations in a sanctioned bank's postperformance (or risk-taking levels) is likely to find a statistical change, but the variation might be due to the bank's pre-sanction performance (or risk-taking levels that these "less severe actions" would likely not be affected by the local economy (the dependent variable) and thus would not impact a bank's behavior. Delis et al. (2017) used the opening of a new branch in a bank's business as an instrumental variable, stating that it increases the probability of breaching the "law-on-the-books," due to changes in its operational structure.
We aim to study the effects of sanctions on sanctioned banks and the possible existence of spillover effects on banks that are unsanctioned but have features similar to those of sanctioned banks. We address the first question, using an approach similar to that of previous studies, i.e., an instrumental variables approach, because of possible endogeneity arising from the impossibility of observing the counterfactual -i.e., what would have been the behavior of a sanctioned bank if it had not been sanctioned? We answer the second question by calculating a proximity index, indicating the degree of similarity between non-sanctioned and sanctioned banks.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, we review previous studies and develop our research hypotheses (section 2). Second, we describe our data and variables (section 3) and identification strategy (section 4). We then discuss our main results (section 5).
Conclusions are drawn in section 6.
Supervision in banking: theory and hypothesis development
Banking supervision, which consists of various tools, such as remote controls (i.e., off-site surveillance systems) and spot checks (i.e., on-site inspections), aims to ensure banks' compliance with regulations. Although on-site and off-site supervisory tools are generally used in all banking systems, the mix of these tools differs across countries and depends on the supervisory styles adopted. For example, a "light-touch approach" is common in Northern (IMF, 2011, page 10) . In Southern European Countries, such as Italy, the supervisory style has not been as light, and both off-site and on-site tools have been adopted.
Our paper does not investigate the effectiveness of a "light" or "heavy" touch; rather, we focus on the Italian experience to assess whether enforcement actions (a publicly available outcome of supervision) were effective. The Bank of Italy has traditionally monitored the safety and soundness of the banking system through a combination of on-and off-site surveillance programs. Off-site supervision tools are regularly used by supervisory authorities, with the objectives of ensuring that intermediaries comply with existing regulations, monitoring the evolution of business management, and verifying the effectiveness of interventions in eliminating deficiencies or abnormalities fostered by bank management (Bank of Italy, 2008).
Off-site supervision is based on data publicly disclosed by banks and, especially, private information provided to supervisory authorities (e.g., financial data, ICAAP reports, compulsory regulatory reporting, mandatory disclosures relating to the detention of significant shareholdings, etc.). At the same time, the Bank of Italy has relied heavily on "on-site" inspections, which are the cornerstone of the supervisory process. Supervisors engage in three different types of In this paper, we focus on formal enforcement actions related to credit risk. Most Italian banks are lending-orientated. Therefore, we posit that such actions will have the most bearing on banks' financial safety and soundness. Specifically, we expect that these enforcement actions influence bank behavior by minimizing incentives to undertake excessive credit risk activities through at least three basic channels (Delis et al., 2017) . First, a formal enforcement action signals adverse information (i.e., the supervisor holds private information on a targeted bank's condition), and this is likely to enhance market discipline and so reduce a bank's risk appetite.
Second, formal enforcement actions can impose direct costs on a bank's management (e.g., requiring an increase in human and technical resources devoted to credit-risk management, changes in the internal-rating system, a new assessment of credit-worthiness criteria, etc.) that also constrain excessive risk-taking. Third, noncompliance with formal enforcement actions carries serious penalties, which in turn increase the likelihood that such actions will generate behavioral changes.
The main aim of our paper is to examine the impact of formal and credit-related enforcement actions on banks' capital and risk among both sanctioned and non-sanctioned banks. Enforcement actions not only aim to penalize guilty banks but also provide examples to all banks in the industry that bad behavior will be penalized. Several paper shave analyzed the consequences of sanctions, but none have investigated the cross-effects of sanctions on nonsanctioned banks. Specifically, Delis and Staikouras (2011) , using an international sample over After analyzing the effects of enforcement actions on sanctioned banks, our paper examines the existence of spillover effects on banks that are unsanctioned but share similar features with sanctioned banks. This is crucial information for regulatory and supervisory authorities, who must take into account possible effects on all banks in the system before issuing enforcement actions.
Data and variables
Data were collected from various sources: enforcement actions were manually collected from the Table 1 .
< INSERT HERE TABLE 1>
After matching all the data, we obtained a sample of 328 banks that had been subject to enforcement actions. The total number of sanctioned banks is inferior to the total number of individual enforcement actions because some banks received more than one sanction in the period analyzed. We address the multiple sanctions problem by including only observations of sanctions related to credit risk (S2 and S3) or disclosure failure (S1 and S4); in all other cases, we drop observations to attain a cleaner dataset. To face potential confounding effects 2 , we also drop observation at time t+1 for banks that received an enforcement action at time t. As reported in Table 2 , Panel A, the most frequent sanction is related to 'general organizational failure' (225 cases), followed by deficiencies in the credit process (206 cases). Sanctions related to credit risk (S2 and S3) were the most numerous, comprising 310 cases. In 2011, we observed the largest number of banks (44) sanctioned for credit risk (CRS), followed by 2007 and 2005.
As shown in Panel B of Table 2 , the largest number of observations concerns cooperative banks, followed by commercial banks and saving banks. The number of foreign banks is negligible.
< INSERT HERE TABLE 2>

Bank-level and macroeconomic variables
Data relating to accounting and financial information were selected from the Italian Banking Association database. As shown in Table 2 , we group our variables in three categories:
supervisory variables, independent variables and dependent variables.
The effects of sanctions are analyzed by focusing on various indicators of bank risk, capital adequacy and activities, as in previous research (Delis et al. 2017 ). First, we calculate a regulatory risk indicator, i.e., the ratio of regulatory risk-weighted assets to total assets (RWA).
We then define two measures of bank credit portfolio quality the ratio of non-performing loans to a bank's regulatory capital (NPL1) and the ratio of non-performing loans to a bank's total loans (NPL2). We capture liquidity risk with the Liquidity Ratio (LIQ), i.e. the ratio of cash due from banks to total demand deposits. We measure banks' capital adequacy with two indicators, namely, the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets (TIER1) and the ratio of Tier 2 capital to risk-weighted assets (TIER2). Finally, we measure banking activities by examining credit orientation (i.e., the ratio of total loans to total assets) and bond investment (government bonds + local government bonds + short-term corporate bonds and corporate bonds) / (total assetstangible fixed assets -intangible fixed assets).
We also included various control variables related to bank profitability (Return on Assets, ROA), size (the logarithm of Total Assets), cost efficiency (operating cost over the intermediation margin), exposure to the interbank market in terms of both credit and debt volume (CRI and DBI, denoting, respectively, the ratio of credits to the interbank market to Total credit and the ratio of debt to the interbank market to Total debt). We also measure bank stability using Z-scores, which have been extensively used in the banking literature (as in Houston et al., 2010; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Fiordelisi and Mare, 2014, among others). The Z-score is a proxy for a bank's distance to default (i.e., the number of standard deviations by which a bank's profitability must fall to devour its entire capital buffer) and is calculated as:
( 1) where the i subscript denotes the cross-sectional dimension across banks; the j subscript denotes the Italian regions (20 regions); t denotes the time dimension; Zi,t is the Z-score; denotes the leverage ratio (i.e., the share of total equity (E) in total assets (TA)), ROA is the return on assets, and σ(ROA) is the one-year regional time varying standard deviation of the return on assets. 3 A high Z-score implies a lower default probability. Because the Z-score is highly skewed, we smoothed the extreme values by taking the logarithmic transformation of the variable, following
Laeven and Levine (2009) and Schaeck and Cihak (2012) .
In Panels C and D of Table 2 , we report some descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables used in our empirical analysis. The core business of Italian banks is mostly lending (the mean value of the loans to customers on total assets ratio is 76%) and this lending orientation is also associated with high credit risk levels: non-performing loans represent (on average) 31% of regulatory capital and 4% of total loans. Regarding capital levels, the meanTIER1ratio is 17% and Tier 2 ratio is 1.2%. The mean return on assets is 5% and operating efficiency (measured by operating cost to income ratio) is (on average) 70%. Market funding covers 23% of total assets.
3 If a bank presents branches in more than one region, the standard deviation for each year is calculated at the national level using all available data.
Preliminary inspections
In this section, we run some preliminarily investigation to analyze if there are some differences in risk-taking in means between sanctioned and non-sanctioned banks. Specifically, we report in the Table 3 the t-tests for differences in means among our dependent variables (Panel A) and independent variables (Panel B).
As expected, the two groups of banks (i.e. the ones receiving an enforcement action in a given year and the ones that did not receive any sanctions? in that year) have different mean levels of risks. Specifically, sanctioned banks display a higher mean level (significant at the 1% level) of non-performing loans (NPL1, and NPL2) and regulatory risk (RWA) than nonsanctioned banks. Interestingly, non-sanctioned banks have a greater TIER1 capital (significant at the 1% level) than sanctioned banks focusing on the TIER1 ratio, but lower TIER2capital (significant at the 5% level). Finally, non-sanctioned banks have a greater amount of credits on the total assets (TLTA) than the sanctioned banks (significant at the 10% level). The means of the other variables are not statistically different within the two groups of banks. In Table 4 , we report the correlations among our variables.
< INSERT HERE TABLES 3 and 4>
Identification strategy
We adopt a two-step identification strategy: first, we present our econometric approach (section 4.1); then we explain our instrumental variable and identification strategy (section 4.2). Finally, we present the methodology for calculating the spillover effect (section 4.3).
4.1Econometric model
Empirically, we seek to estimate the effects of credit enforcement actions on several measures of bank activity. In doing so, we address the endogeneity problem that arises from the fact that we cannot observe how sanctioned banks might have behaved had they not been subject to formal enforcement actions. If we do not take into account possible endogeneity, least-squares-based methods are biased and inconsistent.
Following past papers that have examined the impact of an endogenous event on various aspects of banking, we use a two-stage Instrumental Variables (IV) model. In the first step, following Angrist (2001) , we estimate a linear regression of the endogenous regressor on the instruments by least squares as follows:
In the second step, we regress the outcome on the predicted value of the endogenous regressor, using least squares:
where CRS is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the bank is sanctioned for credit risk (i.e., if S2 or S3takes a value of 1) and zero otherwise; Z are the instrumental variables; and the Xs are the exogenous variables, i.e., a vector of bank-level variables. To overcome the missing variables problem, we estimate a model with fixed effects for bank specialization (to account for time invariant differences among bank categories), and years (to consider the effects of differences among years over the sample period). We also cluster standard errors at the bank level. 4 We consider five different dependent variables that may be affected by credit risk sanctions: i) the ratio of total non-performing loans to regulatory capital (NPL1); ii) the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets (TIER1); iii) the ratio of Tier 2 capital to risk-weighted assets (TIER2); iv) the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets (RWA); and v) the ratio of total loans to total assets (TLTA).
Additionally, we employ three other dependent variables: vi) the ratio of total nonperforming loans to total assets (NPL2); vii) the ratio of total bonds to total assets, excluding tangible and intangible fixed assets (BOND); and viii) the ratio of liquidity and interbank credit to total assets (LIQ). NPL2 is an alternative measure of non-performing loans; BOND measures the share of securities among total assets to investigate whether the weight of securities among 4 In estimating our empirical models, we dropped the observation at time t+1for each bank that received an enforcement action at the time t to face potential confounding effects. We would like to thank one of the referees for making this suggestion.
total assets grows in the year following sanction; LIQ is a placebo dependent variable that we assume does not vary with credit risk sanctions. All independent variables are lagged one year.
We provide definitions of all the variables in Table 1 .
Equations (1) and (2) are simultaneously estimated, with error terms assumed to be jointly normally distributed. The coefficient of interest isb1, which measures the effect of sanctions on banks not directly subject to sanctions.
The fundamental problem for the reliability of the results relates to the choice and validity of the instruments. We consider this problem in more detail in the next section.
Instrumental variables and identification strategy
The instrumental variables estimates become important in the presence of endogeneity and reverse causality, i.e., in contexts where exogeneity may not hold. The presence of omitted variables, measurement errors and simultaneity can negatively affect the results of the estimates.
The IV approach can resolve this problem if the following assumptions hold: i) the IV are correlated with the endogenous regressors (relevance criterion), i.e., E [Z'X]  0; ii) the IV are not correlated with the error term (exogeneity, also called the orthogonality condition), i.e., E[Z'U] = 0; and iii) the IV do not directly affect the dependent variable (exclusion criterion). If ii) and iii) hold, the instruments are valid. If i) holds, but the correlations between the instruments and the endogenous regressors are small, the instruments are valid but weak.
The choice of instruments is therefore crucial. We select two instruments: the sanction imposed for general organizational failure (S1) and the sanction imposed for disclosure failure (S4). These two variables are satisfactory from both a theoretical and empirical standpoint.
Specifically, our dependent variable is related to bank credit risk-taking (e.g., the Nonperforming Loan Ratio, the Total loan ratio, the Risk Weighted asset ratio) and capital adequacy (the Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios). Because Italian banks are mostly lending-oriented commercial banks, the RWA and the Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios are more closely related to credit risk than to other financial risks taken by banks. Thus, there is no reason to expect that sanctions imposed for general organizational failure (S1) and for disclosure failure (S2) directly relate to bank credit risk or capital levels. This theoretical expectation is also supported by empirical data: the correlation with our endogenous variable is high (the supervisory authority often simultaneously sanctions banks for credit risk, general organizational failure and disclosure failure), while the correlation with our dependent variables is low, as they are directly related to credit risk.
As we have two instrumental variables and only one endogenous variable, we can implement the Sargan-Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions: under the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation, the test statistic follows a chisquared distribution in the number of over-identifying restrictions.
The spillover effect
Our second (and main) question addresses the spillover effect: do enforcement actions against competitors influence the risk-taking of non-sanctioned banks? We expect that banks that are "closer" to sanctioned banks may undertake actions to reduce the risk of being sanctioned. In this case, sanctions issued by a supervisory authority could achieve the dual purpose of punishing problematic banks and discouraging other banks from engaging in problematic behavior, thereby incentivizing virtuous behavior.
To test our hypothesis, we measure the distance between each non-sanctioned bank and the mean of sanctioned banks. Specifically, we use the square root of the Mahalanobis distance, which has been widely adopted in finance to measure distances between firms. The Mahalanobis distance, a measure of distance in multidimensional space, has several interesting properties: i) it accounts for covariance among variables; and ii) it reduces to the Euclidean distance for uncorrelated variables with unit variance. It is obtained as:
where X consists of TIER1, TIER2, TLTA, SIZE, ROA, LIQ, and Z-SCORE at time t, and the subscript i indicates an unsanctioned bank.
We normalize the Mahalanobis distance so that the variables considered have a common variation field, using the following formula:
Once we measure the distance of each unsanctioned bank from sanctioned banks, we again run equations (1) and (2), focusing only on unsanctioned banks and replacing the dummy variable measuring sanctions with the Mahalanobis distance. We also use as an instrument the lagged value of the Mahalanobis distance 5 .
Results
In this section, we discuss our empirical findings. First, we show the effects of enforcement actions on sanctioned banks -the banks that are the direct targets of such actions -(section 5.1) and we perform several robustness checks (section 5.2). We then show the effects of enforcement actions on non-sanctioned banks (section 5.3). Table 5 shows the results for the five dependent variables. We report the second stage of the regressions and the value of the coefficients and standard errors of the two instrumental variables in the first stage.
The effects of enforcement actions on sanctioned banks
< INSERT HERE TABLE 5>
Our variable of interest is the credit risk sanction (CRS). As shown in column 1 of Table   5 , enforcement actions for credit risk-related reasons are followed (after one year) by an increase in the value of non-performing loans compared with regulatory capital (NPL1), an effect that is statistically significant at the 1% level. The high value of the estimated coefficient suggests that when banks are sanctioned, they off-load non-performing loans in an effort to clean their balance sheets. This approach naturally results in a higher value of non-performing loans in the year following sanction and at the same time leads to more truthful accounting. Specifically, NPL1
increases by 0.24 points. This result contrasts with previous research (e.g., Delis et al., 2017) , partly because different accounting principles were adopted and partly due to the different intensities of the financial crises that have affected Italy. As a result of a higher volume of NPLs, in fact, there was a larger volume of loan loss provisioning that banks that were already troubled could not support. Basically, it is believed that many banks delayed the classification of problematic loans. However, correct classification becomes inevitable when a sanction is imposed.
Consistent with this result, we find (column 2) a similar effect with respect to the ratio banks' risk-weighted assets to total assets (RWA). A credit risk sanction causes an increase in RWA, although the impact is smaller, at just 0.05 points. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level. Although this result may appear counterintuitive-one would expect that Overall, our results strongly suggest that credit risk-related sanctions lead banks, in the year following sanctions, to offload problematic loans and reduce their lending orientation, behavior associated with a reduction in Tier 1 capital and an increase in Tier 2 capital.
Turning to the instrumental variables, both S1 and S4 are always statistically significant at the 1% level, with positive signs in the first stage. This shows that the penalty for credit risk is positively associated with sanctions linked to organizational and general disclosures failure. All five estimations reject the under-identifying restrictions test: we reject the null hypothesis that the IV is uncorrelated with the endogenous regressor at the 1% level. We also reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments at the 1% level, excluding instruments that are weakly correlated with the endogenous regressor. Finally, in all our estimations, we cannot reject the hypothesis of over-identifying restrictions. Thus, the instruments are valid. In Table 6 , we follow-up on these results by estimating the effects of sanctions on three other variables, namely, the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans (NPL2), the ratio of a bank's exposure to government bonds to its non-fixed assets (BOND), and the ratio of a bank's highly liquid assets (i.e., cash and interbank credit) to total assets (LIQ). Using these three measures, we achieve different objectives. The first variable enables us to run a robustness check: specifically, we measure bank loan portfolio quality differently, so that we can check the consistency of the results reported in Table 5 . The second variable allows us to complement our analysis of lending: specifically, if sanctioned banks really want to reduce their risk-taking, their reduction in lending should be associated with an increase in safe assets. We expect banks, whether sanctioned or not, to increase their purchases of government bonds, absorbing less regulatory capital than loans. The third variable,
i.e. highly liquid assets (cash and interbank credit), is a sort of placebo variable, as the credit risk-related sanction son which we focus are not expected to affect a bank's liquidity management.
< INSERT HERE TABLE 6>
As shown in column 1 of Table 6 , credit risk-related sanctions affect NPL2in a way that is strongly consistent with their effect onNPL1, as seen in Table 5 , although the impact is smaller. As such, our conclusions are not influenced by the measure selected to account for loan portfolio quality. In column 2, we show that in the following period, sanctioned banks increase their purchases of securities (riskless or less risky assets) relative to loans, but this is only significant at the 10% level. This confirms our conclusion from Table 5 : when banks are sanctioned, they complement their decline in lending with an increase in their holdings of government bonds to reduce their risk-taking. In column 3, we show that credit risk-related sanctions have no statistically significant effect on the liquidity ratio.
Some Robustness checks
We perform several robustness checks. First, we test whether market discipline affects the behavior of sanctioned banks relative to non-sanctioned ones. We then examine the effects of financial crises on sanctioned banks.
Market discipline (MKTDIS) is calculated as the ratio of market funding to total assets 6 .
We interact this variable with credit risk sanction to examine whether market discipline increases the effects of sanctions.
< INSERT HERE TABLE 7>
As shown in Table 7 , a higher market-funding ratio is associated with a decline of nonperforming loans (NPL1), and an increase in lending activities (TLTA). The overall effect of a higher market-funding ratio is a positive link with the risk weighed asset ratio (RWA): this suggests that banks tend to collect market-funds to finance risky business investments (such as loans, which have high supervisory risk-weights) rather than other assets (e.g. liquid assets)
with low supervisory risk-weights. This is not surprising since collecting markets are not a nonzero cost source of funds (therefore banks need to provide investors with adequate coupons to successfully place their instruments). Consequently, banks have to invest these funds in a profitable (and risky) way. The variable of main interest is the interaction variable between CRS and MKTDIS. The interaction is highly significant in three of five models. The effect of sanctions, combined with market discipline, is to increase the number of non-performing loans (NPL1), the risk weighed asset ratio (RWA), and the total loans ratio (TLTA). Once a sanction is implemented, the market forces banks to clean their balance sheets more thoroughly, leading to an increase in risky assets and a reduction in total loans. The interaction variable for TIER1 and
TIER2is not significant, but market discipline leads to a decrease in TIER1 and an increase in TIER2, in line with the results in Table 5 .
< INSERT HERE TABLE 8>
The effect of the interaction between market discipline and credit risk sanctions is statistically significant and relevant in terms of magnitude of the coefficient. Additionally (as shown in Table 7 ), the interaction between market discipline and the second variable for nonperforming loans (NPL2) is significant, confirming the regulators' view expressed in Pillar 3 of Basel 3. Conversely, the interaction between market discipline and credit risk sanctions is not significant when we use bond and liquid ratios (respectively, BOND and LIQ) as dependent variables.
In the second robustness check, we test the effect of financial crises 7 . Specifically, we investigate whether the 2007 financial crisis played a role in banks' reactions to enforcement actions. We therefore interact the credit risk sanction variable with a dummy variable that captures the crisis (i.e., a variable that assumes a value of 1 in the more problematic years of the financial crisis in Italy following the 2007 credit crisis through the end of the sovereign debt crisis in 2012).
< INSERT HERE TABLE 9>
The results in Table 9 confirm and bolster our basic estimations. During the financial crisis, the effects of sanctions are stronger on non-performing loans (NPL1), risk weighted assets (RWA), total loans (TLTA) and, as shown in Table 10 , NPL2.
< INSERT HERE TABLE 10>
The enforcement actions' effects on unsanctioned banks
In this section, we provide empirical evidence pertaining to whether enforcement actions against competitors influence the risk-taking of non-sanctioned banks. Specifically, we posit that a nonsanctioned bank cares about enforcement actions taken against other similar banks and modifies its own risk-taking in response.
We repeated the analysis of models (1) and (2), now focusing only on banks not subjected to enforcement actions and replacing the sanction variables with the square root of the Mahalanobis distance. The interpretation of the latter variable is straightforward: as the Mahalanobis distance of a bank increases, the bank increasingly differs from sanctioned banks.
Because we are positing that non-sanctioned banks that are "similar" to sanctioned banks behave in a similar manner, we expect that the estimated coefficient for this variable is statistically significant and takes a sign opposite that of the sanction dummy.
< INSERT HERE TABLE 11>
In column (1) of Table 11 , we find a negative and statistically significant coefficient for the Mahalanobis distance: this suggests that the more distant a non-sanctioned bank is from sanctioned banks, the more it reduces its ratio of non-performing loans to regulatory capital.
Accordingly, non-sanctioned banks that are close to sanctioned banks increase their NPL ratios, a result that is strongly consistent with our result in Table 5 that sanctioned banks increase their NPL ratios. Overall, this suggests that non-sanctioned banks similar to sanctioned banks clean their balance sheets by offloading non-performing loans. This is also a possible spillover effect of sanctions: non-sanctioned banks bring problematic loans to light in anticipation of regulatory intervention. Interestingly, non-sanctioned banks appear to encounter the same difficulties as sanctioned banks in increasing their Tier1 ratios. In fact, the more distant a bank is from sanctioned banks, the greater is its ability to increase its Tier1 ratio. This effect is consistent with our previous findings for sanctioned banks.
In terms of the Risk Weighted Asset ratio, the Mahalanobis distance shows a positive link: as a bank becomes more distant from sanctioned banks, it increases its Risk-Weighted Asset Ratio. This result is intuitive (non-sanctioned banks reduce their RWA, the more similar they are to sanctioned banks, as they load non-performing loans) but inconsistent with our finding regarding sanctioned banks (which increase their RWA). This suggests that the process of cleaning their balance sheets (captured by the NPL1) is less comprehensive for nonsanctioned banks than for sanctioned banks: non-sanctioned banks can reduce their RWA, while sanctioned bank increase theirs.
Finally, we observe a positive link between the Mahalanobis distance and the total loan ratio: the more distant a bank is from sanctioned banks, the greater are its lending activities.
This result is intuitive: non-sanctioned banks reduce their lending by larger amounts, the more similar they are to sanctioned banks.
These results are confirmed by analyzing other variables of interest, as reported in Table   12 .
< INSERT HERE TABLE 12>
The effect of non-performing loans on non-sanctioned banks similar to sanctioned banks is confirmed by the second variable of interest, the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (NPL2). This result reinforces the effect of similarity on the behavior of non-sanctioned banks that are "close" to sanctioned banks and confirms our results in Table 6 . This effect is also confirmed for BOND: the positive sign of the coefficient, which is highly significant and of the same magnitude as the corresponding coefficient in Table 6 , indicates that non-sanctioned banks that are similar to sanctioned banks increase their portfolio of bonds. Moreover, the data indicate that such banks increase their liquidity.
Overall, our results provide empirical evidence that there is a spillover effect: nonsanctioned banks care about the enforcement actions taken against other similar banks and modify their own risk-taking behavior in response. Our results, which clearly show that banks become more prudent after sanctions, support public disclosure of enforcement actions.
Conclusion
By focusing on the Italian banking industry (an ideal case study, given the magnitude of NPLs and the tradition of the Bank of Italy in supervising banks through on-site inspections and enforcement actions), our paper examines the effects of enforcement actions on banks. We show that credit risk-related sanctions lead banks, in the year following the imposition of sanctions, to offload problematic loans and reduce their lending orientation, behavior associated with a reduction in Tier 1 capital and an increase in Tier 2 capital. We also provide empirical evidence that non-sanctioned banks behave more similarly to sanctioned banks; the more similar they are to sanctioned banks.
Our results are particularly relevant to supervisory authorities, as the question of whether corrective supervisory actions should be publicly disclosed-to show that bad behavior by banks is punished, leading to more prudent behavior-or remain confidential-to prevent panic and reduce the risk of a systemic crisis-has been subject to debate. Our results favor public disclosure of enforcement actions, as even non-sanctioned banks modify their behavior and risktaking in response to enforcement actions. This conclusion supports the Single Supervisory Definitions for all variables are provided in Table 1 . The dependent variables in each regression are noted in the first line of the table below. Independent variables are lagged 1 period. We also drop the observation at time t+1 for each bank that received an enforcement action at the time t to face potential confounding effects. We would like to thank one of the referees for giving us this suggestion. In the margin, we report coefficients and standard errors for the two instrumental variables. *** indicates significance of 1 percent or less; ** between 1 and 5 percent; * between 5 and 10 percent.
Dependent Variables at time t+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
